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A firm whose profits increase when outsiders believe that it pays high wages may induce its 
workers to over-consume goods that signal high compensation. One implication is that firms 
may lobby government to subsidize fringe benefits with high signaling value, such as com-
pany cars, to their employees. We show that under plausible conditions the provision of fringe 
benefits indeed can signal the firm's type. Moreover, we demonstrate the existence of multiple 
equilibria---one equilibrium has no firm providing certain fringe benefits, whereas another 
equilibrium has fringe benefits signal the firm's type. The paper further shows that a firm that 
provides the fringe benefit may oppose a government subsidizing it too heavily, because a 
large subsidy could destroy the signaling value of the benefit. The analysis shows that an em-
ployer may even provide a fringe benefit to employees who place no value on it. Our results 
are consistent with many stylized facts on the provision of fringe benefits by firms. More gen-
erally, we the model highlights how and why a firm may engage in behavior which signals the 
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Firms often provide their employees with fringe benefits instead of cash. Examples 
include health care benefits, pension plans, subsidized meals, and transport-related benefits. The 
literature suggests three main reasons why firms provide fringe benefits (see, e.g., Katz and 
Mankiw (1985)): (i) they may raise the firm’s productivity; (ii) the firm may be able to provide 
the fringe benefit at a lower cost than its retail price to workers due to, e.g., economies of scale; 
(iii) compared to payment in cash, fringe benefits may imply tax advantages to either the firm or 
the employee.  
In Europe, a striking phenomenon is the large number of company cars firms provide to 
their workers. Company cars are most common in the UK, but also in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, France and other European countries they are widely observed. In 
1995, for example, 42 percent of new cars in the UK were company cars (Economist 
Intelligence Unit (1996)). A large survey among 62,500 Belgian workers found that in 2006 
some 21 percent received a company car as part of their compensation package (Wuyts 
(2009)). For the Netherlands, 15 percent of all employees have a company car (Guttiérez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)). A critical reason for the widespread occurrence of 
company cars in Europe is their very favourable tax treatment.
1 For the Netherlands, it is 
estimated that company cars are provided to employees at an effective price that is in the 
range of 20 to 60 percent lower than the market price of the cars. The welfare cost from the 
distortionary tax advantages is valued at 600 to 800 euro per car per year. For the whole of 
Europe, welfare costs are estimated to be some 12 billion euro per year (Guttierez and van 
Ommeren (2010)). 
The question is why governments allow these tax advantages? Why does the 
government favor compensation in fringe benefits over wages? Several explanations could be 
offered. For example, as small businesses allow the owner to get private consumption benefits 
tax-free, the government may want to give the same benefits to corporations to avoid 
distortions and to prevent shrinking of the corporate sector. Or subsidies to company cars may 
be a way of subsidizing commuting costs to reduce the inefficiency of the income tax (see 
Van Dender (2003)). Still another argument is that, in an effort to reduce inflation, 
government subsidizes company cars to allow firms to raise worker utility without raising 
wages. Of course, it is not obvious in any of these cases that subsidizing fringe benefits is the 
best policy to attain the corresponding objective.   
This paper considers another mechanism that may explain the demand for subsidies by 
firms that provide fringe benefits such as company cars. The model we develop is based on 
the argument that a firm may benefit from outsiders believing that it pays high wages. Higher 
perceived compensation by outsiders can benefit a firm in several ways. In the presence of 
search costs by job seekers, a firm may attract more applicants of the type that it needs. 
Consumers may believe that the better the quality of workers at the firm, the better the quality 
of its product, and thus the more willing would consumers be to buy the firm’s goods. Similar 
effects may arise with suppliers---they may believe that a firm with high-quality workers is 
                                                            
1 See the references to the Belgian and Dutch cases given above, and reports of the Association of European Car 
Manufacturers (ACEA). Apart from favourable tax treatment there are other potential explanations for the use of 
transport-related fringe benefits by firms. For example, search models of imperfectly competitive labour markets 
can explain compensation for longer commutes (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Zax (1991), Manning (2003)). 
Van Ommeren et al. (2006) empirically find that people with longer commutes indeed receive more transport-
related fringe benefits. It is unlikely, however, that search arguments alone justify the very high numbers of 
company cars observed in some countries. Similarly, both Guttiérez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) and 
Wuyts (2009) provide convincing evidence that the widespread provision of company cars cannot be explained 




less likely to fail, or more likely to process invoices properly, so that a firm with a reputation 
for hiring high-quality workers may be able to buy inputs at lower cost.  
The literature supports the idea that firms may benefit from outsiders’ beliefs that 
wages are high. Literature in social psychology indeed speaks of organization image and of 
the “perceived external prestige” of an organization, i.e., the views of members about 
outsiders’ beliefs. Evidence suggests that an organization benefits from increased prestige, by 
enjoying increased organization attachment (Fuller et al. (2006)); moreover, companies can 
better attract quality applicants if they convey to them a positive image (Turban and Cable 
(2003), Gatewood et al. (1993), Rynes and Barber (1990)). In turn, consistent with our 
assumption, increased pay at a firm increases the firm's image (Cable and Graham (2000)). 
Outsiders, however, cannot directly observe pay. But they do observe some 
consumption by current workers. As we will argue below, empirical evidence suggests that, 
compared to other consumption goods, cars are likely to provide especially good signals of 
wages. Providing company cars then becomes profitable for firms that benefit from outsiders 
believing that they hire workers of high quality or produce high-quality products, provided 
not all other firms also give cars. The firms providing company cars will therefore lobby for 
subsidies that induce a separating equilibrium that allows them to signal their type.  
To conserve space, we shall not explicitly model political pressures that generate 
governmental programs subsidizing firms which provide company cars. What is important for 
our purposes is to show that the signaling motive can affect demand for subsidies to company 
cars, and so can explain the existence of such subsidies. Our model could easily be embedded 
in a Grossman-Helpman (1994) type model of lobbying by special interest groups, in our case 
the firms benefiting from outsiders’ beliefs that they pay high wages. In that model, each 
organized special interest offers monetary contributions to governmental officials who adopt 
policies the special interest favors. The governmental official maximizes a weighted sum of 
social welfare and contributions, so that if special interests favor the policy, whereas the 
taxpayers who pay for the policy are not organized to lobby or to make monetary 
contributions, governmental policy will favor the special interest. Empirical evidence 
consistent with such a model is found in Goldberg  and Maggi (1999) and in Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000). Most recently, Chirinko and Williams (2010) offer direct empirical 
evidence that companies indeed directly affect tax policies and to some extent ‘buy’ favorable 
tax rates.  
The model we consider has two types of workers and two types of firms. One type of 
firm needs only low-ability workers, and does not benefit from employing high-ability 
workers, or from having a reputation for hiring such workers. The other firm type hires only 
high-ability workers, and it gains from outsiders’ beliefs that it employs such workers. We 
then study the incentives of different firms in providing a fringe benefit of a given market 
value as a function of the net cost to the firm. Depending on the size of the subsidy, we find 
that both separating equilibria (in which only firms that benefit from outsiders believing it 
hires high-quality workers provide the fringe benefit) and pooling equilibria (in which all 
firms provide the fringe benefit) may arise. However, under plausible conditions, the 
provision of fringe benefits indeed signals a firm's type. It is further shown that a firm that 
provides the fringe benefit may oppose a government subsidizing it too heavily: a large 
subsidy could destroy the signaling value of the benefit. Moreover, for a range of subsidy 
values, we show the existence of multiple equilibria: one equilibrium has no firm providing 
certain fringe benefits, whereas another equilibrium has fringe benefits provided to signal the 
firm's type. Lastly, introducing preference variations for the fringe benefit among workers, the 
analysis shows why firms may offer contracts that let workers self-select between a pure cash 
option and a compensation package that includes a company car. An employer may even 
provide a fringe benefit to employees who place no value on it.  
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Note that the model developed below need not apply only to signaling the quality of 
workers to outsiders. Similar analysis applies if junior workers wonder what senior employees 
earn. Evidence suggests that workers at a firm want senior co-workers to have high wages: the 
expectation of future earnings suggested by their co-workers’ high wages more than 
compensates any jealousy these higher wages may induce (see, Clark, Kristensen and 
Westergård-Nielsen (2009)). Since in practice wages of co-workers are often unobservable, a 
firm may then want to signal to junior workers that it pays senior employees well, by 
providing them with fringe benefits such as company cars. This benefits the firm: workers 
who interpret this signal as future potential earnings may exert higher effort or stay longer 
with the firm, reducing costly labor turnover.  
  The predictions of the model are consistent with several stylized facts and, although 
reliable data on the provision of company cars in different countries and by different types of 
firms are scarce, with most of the available empirical evidence. Although, conditional on 
wages, the subsidy is the same for all firms, not all firms offer company cars. In general, the 
model suggests that we will see more company cars when such cars can be expected to be 
better signals. We therefore expect more company cars in large than in small firms, because 
the signal is likely to be more valuable to larger firms. A small firm may gain little from 
outsiders believing it hires high-ability workers---the number of potential employees, 
suppliers, and customers it attracts is in any case small. Within firms we expect, conditional 
on wages, more company cars among senior workers. Both predictions are confirmed in 
detailed empirical analyses (Guttierez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010), Wuyts (2009)).  
To the extent that firms signal high wages to attract high quality workers, the model 
implies that one expects more lobbying for subsidies and more company cars in countries 
with limited long-distance residential mobility and, as a consequence, local or regional rather 
than nationwide recruiting by firms. High residential mobility and extensive labor markets 
jointly mean that a person who observes a signal that a firm hires high-ability workers is 
nevertheless unlikely to apply to a local firm, so signaling by that firm benefits it little. In 
other words, signaling does not make much sense if firms recruit nationwide and people are 
willing to move long distances. The paper further explains why subsidies are limited---it is 
not just counter pressures or concerns about social welfare and equity. Firms themselves may 
oppose subsidies that are too generous. 
Furthermore, the model suggests that firms that offer fringe benefits such as company 
cars may want to offer pure cash alternatives. This is again consistent with observed firm 
behavior. Though many firms offering company cars do not give a pure cash option, many 
others do; they allow workers to self-select the contract type (see Watson Wyatt (2008)).  
Lastly, although we develop the model in terms of company car provision for purposes 
of concreteness, the model is more generally applicable to some other fringe benefits as well. 
As a general statement, the model suggests that companies will provide fringe benefits that 
are perceived as good signals of the quality of workers and firms. 
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents some 
evidence that, among other typical consumer goods, cars may serve as very good signals of 
high but unobservable wages in firms. The basic model of this paper is presented in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we extend the model to capture differences in preferences for cars among 
workers. A model with fringe benefits of variable quality is developed in Section 5. 
Conclusions and implications end the paper. 
 
 
2. Fringe benefits as signals 
An extensive literature discusses fringe benefits, but it has so far ignored the role of such 
benefits in signaling unobservable wages. The early literature focused on the role of the tax  
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system in the provision of non-wage compensation (e.g., Long and Scott (1982), Clotfelter 
(1983), Zax (1988)), and on the related question of whether and how fringe benefits should be 
taxed (see Katz and Mankiw (1985), Adamache and Sloan (1985)). More recently, several 
studies analyze the implications of fringe benefits for the outcomes on the labour market, such 
as the effects on wages, labour turnover and unemployment (see, e.g., Hashimoto and Zhao 
(2000) and Dale-Olsen (2004)). Moreover, a series of papers concentrate on specific fringe 
benefits, including health insurance (Olson (2002), Royalty (2000), Gruber (2001), Gruber and 
Lettau (2004)), pension advantages (Bernstein (2002)), and transport-related benefits such as 
parking, relocation subsidies and company cars (Shoup (2005), van Ommeren, van der Vlist and 
Nijkamp (2006), Guttiérez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)). Lastly, some work (e.g., 
Oyer 2008) also considers how fringe benefits can induce self-selection of workers, to the 
benefit of the employer.  
Unlike the previous literature, the model developed below studies the role of fringe 
benefits as signals of imperfectly observable wages and quality of workers. Casual 
observations and empirical evidence suggests that cars may serve this purpose very well: nice 
cars are quite generally associated with status or quality (see the literature on status goods 
(e.g., Ireland (1994, 1998)), and they are among the most visible consumer goods available. A 
young job seeker in Belgium told us that his boss preferred that he not park a cheap-looking 
car in the firm’s front parking lot. Fancy restaurants in Orange County, California which offer 
valet parking are known to park the most expensive cars outside the front entrance. More 
importantly, empirical evidence presented by Heffetz (2004, 2009) suggests that cars are 
among the most visible consumer goods. In particular, Heffetz (2004) constructed a telephone 
survey questionnaire where the main question read:  
 
Imagine that you meet a new person who lives in a household similar to yours. 
Imagine that their household is not different from other similar households, except that 
they like to, and do, spend more than average on [title of category]. 
 
Would you notice this about them, and if so, for how long would you have to have 
known them, to notice it? Would you notice it almost immediately upon meeting them 
for the first time, a short while after, a while after, only a long while after, or never? 
 
Based on the responses to the survey, Heffetz (2009) constructs three ‘visibility’ indices. In 
all three cases, cars rank in the top three. For example, in one of the rankings it ranks number 
two, after cigarettes but before clothing, jewelry, furniture, cell phones, etc. For cars, some 27 
percent responded ``almost immediately" to the above question, 71 percent answered “almost 
immediately” or “a short while after” (by way of comparison, cell phones scored 40 percent), 
and less than 11 percent indicated that they would never or only a long while after notice a 
household’s above average spending on cars.
2  
Heffetz (2009) uses these results to justify embedding a signaling motive into the 
utility framework developed by Ireland (1994, 1998). In addition to fundamental consumption 
utility, consumers are assumed to care also about others' (or society's) beliefs: doing well is no 
longer enough; individuals also want everybody to know (or at least to believe) that they are 
                                                            
2 Clothing also scored very high in the visibility index. Our model would suggest that some firms would want to 
subsidize the purchase of expensive clothing by their workers. Our impression is that such subsidies are much 
less common than company cars; their signaling value may be reduced because firms have no control over 
wearing these clothes outside the workplace. Whenever the signaling value can be guaranteed (e.g., by 
sponsoring clothes of media personalities such as actors, sports champions etc.), firms do indeed subsidize 
clothes.     
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doing well. For the purpose of this paper, these visibility results have another important 
implication: to the extent that a firm wants to signal to outsiders that it pays high wages, 
providing workers with company cars may be the most effective signal. Not only is a nice car 
a reliable status good, it is also the most likely consumer good to be observed by others.   
 
 
3. The basic model 
We consider two types of workers and two types of firms. A worker has either low 
ability (L) or high ability (H). The reservation utility of a type-i worker is  i u . Firms are of 
type L or type H. An L-type firm needs only low-ability workers, and does not benefit from 
employing high-ability workers, or from having a reputation for hiring such workers. An H-
type firm hires only high-ability workers, and it gains from outsiders’ beliefs that it employs 
such workers. The supply of the two goods produced by the two firms is perfectly elastic, so 
that all type-H people work at type-H firms, and all type-L people work at type-L firms. The 
utility of a worker with income Y and no car is  () uY . His utility with a car is  () uY v + . Here, v 
is the utility of having the car, assumed to be the same for both types of workers. Let the 
market price of a company car be F. To simplify the analysis we assume no worker owns a 
car if firms provided none; relaxing this assumption does not affect the qualitative results, see 
below.  
To understand the response of different types of firms to the net cost of providing such 
cars, we allow for the possibility that the government subsidizes company cars. This 
governmental subsidy per car is called S. Depending on the size of the subsidy, different types 
of equilibria may arise. In a separating equilibrium an L-type firm does not give cars and an 
H-type does. Alternatively, pooling equilibria may result in which neither or both types of 
firms give cars. 
In what follows, we first study the behavior of firms of type L and H, and we explore 
the different equilibria that may result. We then briefly consider the sensitivity of the results 
with respect to the parameters of the model, and discuss the implications of our findings.   
 
3.1. L-type firm  
If an L-type firm provides a car, it must offer the employee a wage YFL such that L-
type workers attain their reservation utility,  () LL uu Y = . So YFL solves: 
     () ( ) . FL L L uY v u uY += =                   ( 1 )  









=− < =− <
∂∂  
A higher reservation utility obviously reduces the wage that needs to be offered when a 
company car is provided to the worker; assuming declining marginal utility of consuming 
non-car goods, the wage reduction declines at higher reservation utilities. A higher valuation 
of a company car reduces the wage the firm offers.  
Based on the discussion in the introduction, we ignore the possible productivity effects 
of company cars. It is assumed that the firm profits from providing a car only if the wage it 
has to pay in case it does so results in a lower ‘net’ cost to the firm:  
     . FLL YF S Y +−<  
It does not provide a car otherwise. Let  
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. FLL L YF S Y +− =             ( 2 )  
Then the L-type firm will provide a car if the governmental subsidy is at least L S . 
 
3.2. H-type firm 
An H-type firm wants outsiders to believe that it hires high-quality workers. The 
benefit to the firm can arise from greater ability to hire high-ability workers, from efficiency 
wages, from a reputation for providing high-quality products, or from a reputation for having 
competent workers who will interact well with suppliers. We shall explore how the firm may 
signal that it hires high-ability workers, by providing workers with company cars. Let the 
monetary value to the firm of a perfect signal be  F P . It reflects the value to the H-type firm of 
being considered by outsiders to be of type H rather than of type L.  
 
H-type firm in a separating equilibrium 
Consider a separating equilibrium in which the L-type firm does not give cars but the 
H-type does. If the H-type firm provides a car, it must offer the H-type employee a wage YFH 
such that  
     () ( ) FHH H uY v u uY += =          ( 3 )  
In a separating equilibrium the profitability of the signal is  F P  : a firm providing a car will be 
seen by outsiders as being of type H; a firm that does not will be seen as being of type L. 
Therefore, any governmental subsidy satisfying   
     FHH F YF S Y P +−< +  
will sustain a separating equilibrium. Consider the subsidy  H S that makes this inequality an 
equality: 
H FH H F SYYF P =− + −            ( 4 )  
The subsidy  H S is, therefore, the minimum subsidy that sustains a separating equilibrium. In 
principle, if a car sends a strong signal, even a zero subsidy may sustain a separating 
equilibrium. In that case  H S <0 .  
Declining marginal utility of income implies that, when a car is provided, the salary 
reduction for the H-type worker will be larger than for the L-type worker:  
() ( ) H FH L LF YY YY −> −
 
It follows that: 
 
() ( ) 0 LH HF H LL F F SS YY YY P −= − −− +>        ( 5 )  
This implies that a range of subsidy values sustains a separating equilibrium. This range rises 
in the quality of the signal.  
 
H-type firms in a pooling equilibrium with no company cars 
In the separating equilibrium, if a firm deviates the public has clear beliefs about what 
type of firm it is---an H-type firm that provides no company car is viewed as an L-type firm, 
and an L-type firm that gives company cars is viewed as an H-type firm. But in a pooling 
equilibrium where no firm gives a company car, we must make some assumptions about what 
an outsider believes if he does see some firm give a company car. We here make use of the 
Kreps-Cho Intuitive Criterion---what type of firm would benefit more, or suffer less, from 
deviating, by giving a company car. Since by assumption a car is a normal good, a firm that 
hires H-type workers and offers a company car can reduce the wage it pays by more than can 
a firm which hires the lower-paid L-type workers. That is, even in the absence of any  
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signaling benefits to a firm, an H-type firm suffers less from offering a company car, or 
benefits more, than does an L-type firm. We therefore suppose that a firm which deviates 
from the pooling equilibrium in which no firm offers a company car is viewed as being an H-
type firm.  
Suppose that in a pooling equilibrium where no cars are given outsiders believe an 
arbitrary firm is of type H with probability h. For example, this could be a function of the 
fraction of H-type firms in the total number of firms. As before, let the monetary value of the 
signal (i.e., the value of outsiders believing it is an H-type firm) to the H-type firm be  F P . The 
extra profitability to the H-type firm from deviating from a pooling equilibrium with no cars 
and signaling its type is then(1 ) F hP − . If few firms are of type H, the value of deviating from 
the pooling equilibrium and explicitly signaling that a firm is of type H is large. If almost all 
firms are H-type, then even in the absence of signaling, an outsider believes the firm is likely 
an H type, so an H-type firm benefits little from providing a car.  
The H-type firm will want to deviate from the pooling equilibrium and provide a car if 
  (1 ) . FH H F YF S Y h P +−< +−  
It does not provide a car otherwise. Therefore, an H-type firm will provide a car if 
p




HF H H F SYYF h P =− + − −          ( 6 )  
can be interpreted as the minimum subsidy that induces the H-type firm to deviate from a 
pooling (the superscript ‘p’ refers to ‘pooling’) equilibrium with no company cars.  
Using the same argument as before, we obtain:  
 
() ( ) ( 1 ) 0
p
LH HF H LL F F SS YY YY h P −=− −− + − >        ( 7 )  
Thus, a range of subsidy values leads the H-type firm to deviate from a pooling equilibrium in 
which no firm gives a car, inducing a separating equilibrium. Note that this last inequality 
holds even if the H-type firm gains nothing from signaling its type. The difference rises in the 
value of the signal and declines in the fraction of H-type firms. 
 
  The H-type firm in a pooling equilibrium where both types give cars 
When the governmental subsidy exceeds SL, a dominant strategy for an L-type firm is 
to provide a car. Of course, the net profit of the H-type firm drops when the L-type firm also 
provides cars: a company car loses its signaling value that the firm hires high-ability workers. 
Outsiders will, as when no company cars are provided, believe the firm is of type H with 
probability h. But under our assumptions on marginal utilities it is still also a dominant 
strategy for an H-type firm to provide a car. Hence, for subsidy levels  L SS >  a pooling 
equilibrium results in which both types of firms provide cars.  
 
3.3. Equilibrium results  
Depending on the size of the subsidy, different types of equilibria may result. 
Moreover, the different values of the critical subsidies  H S and 
p
H S can generate multiple 
equilibria.  
Consider first the relation between the size of the subsidy and the type of equilibrium 
that will result. For low subsidies or for high taxes (
p
H SS < ), we have a pooling equilibrium 
with no firms providing company cars. Governmental subsidies  
p
HL SS S <<   
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induce H-type firms to deviate and provide cars. This yields a separating equilibrium that has 
H-type firms provide cars, but not L-type firms. For subsidy levels  L SS >  a pooling 
equilibrium results in which both types of firms provide cars.  
But note that, as argued before, in a separating equilibrium, the signaling value of 
providing a car does not depend on the fraction of firms that are H-types---a firm that 
provides a company car is viewed as an H-type, whereas a firm that does not provide a 
company car is viewed as an L-type. Therefore, the critical subsidy that sustains a separating 
equilibrium is smaller than the critical subsidy that induces an H-type firm to deviate from a 
pooling equilibrium with no company cars. Direct comparison shows (using (4) and (6)): 
 
p
H H SS <  
This may imply multiple equilibria: the governmental subsidy to firms that provide company 
cars may be sufficiently low and the fraction of H-type firms may be sufficiently high so that 
no firm wants to deviate from the pooling equilibrium with no company cars. But the same 
subsidy may be sufficiently high that no firm wants to deviate from a separating equilibrium 
in which all H-type firms do provide company cars.   
Figure 1 illustrates the above results. The curve labeled ( FL YF S + − ) gives the ‘net’ 
cost (i.e., correcting for the subsidy) to the L-type firm of employing a worker if the worker is 
provided with a company car. The subsidy L S is defined at the intersection of this net labor 
cost and the wage  L Y  paid when the company provides no car. Similarly, the curve labeled 
( FH F YF S P +−−) gives the net cost per worker to the H-type firm of providing a car in a 
separating equilibrium, taking account of the value of the signal. It intersects  H Y  at  H S . 
Lastly, the curve ( (1 ) FH F YF S h P +−−− ) gives, for a given value of h , the net cost of 
providing a car to the H-type firm when it deviates from a pooling equilibrium with no cars 
given by any of the firms. Note that it shifts down when there are fewer H-type firms (lower 
h) or the signal is of better quality (higher  F P ). It is clear that the range of subsidy values that 
induces a separating equilibrium is larger when outsiders believe there are fewer H-type firms 
and providing the fringe benefit is a better signal of quality.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 
Note that, depending on the quality of the signal and the number of H-type firms (the 
value of h), a given subsidy may or may not suffice to induce a separating equilibrium. 
Moreover, the possibility of multiple equilibria is illustrated by a subsidy like
*
H S , see Figure 
1. This subsidy is insufficient to induce an H-type firm to deviate from a pooling equilibrium 
with no cars, but is sufficiently large to sustain a separating equilibrium. This subsidy may 
therefore be consistent with both a pooling and a separating equilibrium.  
The model suggests that a wide range of values of the subsidy (
p
H L SS S << ) generate 
a separating equilibrium for the H-type firm, allowing it to signal quality by providing 
company cars to its workers. From the viewpoint of an H-type firm which wants to signal its 
type, the ‘optimal’ subsidy the government should introduce is a subsidy just below SL. This is 
the largest subsidy that allows the firm to signal its type. Unless the subsidy becomes 
unrealistically large (for subsidies exceeding  FL F F FY Y P + −+, which for a high quality 
signal may easily exceed the cost of the car) an H-type firm’s profit in a pooling equilibrium  
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where both types of firms give cars is less than when the governmental subsidy is just below 
SL. This is, therefore, the subsidy that maximizes a type-H firm’s profit.   
 
3.4. Sensitivity to parameters 
We briefly discuss how the reservation utility of workers, their preference for cars, and 
the strength of the signal to the H-type firm affect the equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, we 
consider how the interpretation applies if we account for car ownership when firms provide 
none.  
First, higher reservation utilities (both for L-type and H-type workers) implies that 
higher wages need to be paid, both when a firm provides a company car and when it does not. 
But, assuming declining marginal utility of income, the critical subsidy declines. Both 
, H L SS shift to the left.  
Second, suppose the general preference for cars rises, that is, let the value of v increase 
(the effect of differences in preferences between workers will be discussed separately below, 
see Section 4).  An increase in v allows a firm which provides a car to reduce the wage it 
pays; consequently smaller governmental subsidies are required to induce firms to give a 
company car. Both  , H L SS shift to the left. If H-type workers more highly value cars than do 
L-type workers, then the range of subsidy values for which a separating equilibrium appears 
becomes larger: it becomes more attractive for H-type firms to lobby for a subsidy that still 
generates a separating equilibrium.  
Third, the role of the number of H-type firms and the value of the signal,  F P , to an H-
type firm was discussed  above. An increase in the value of the signal to the H-type firm 
reduces the minimum subsidy the firm needs to make offering a company car beneficial: SH 
will be smaller. This increases the range of subsidy values that allows a separating 
equilibrium for the H-type firm. The same holds when the fraction of H-type firms becomes 
smaller.  
Lastly, note that we assumed throughout the analysis that neither L-type nor H-type 
workers owned car a when firms provide none. Let us relax this obviously unrealistic 
assumption. Consider the L-type firm, and assume L-type workers have a car already when 
paid only in cash. The wage the firm must offer if it gives workers a car must then satisfy   
() ( ). FL L L uY v u uY F v += = − + 
Consequently, any positive subsidy induces the firm to offer a car, and  0 L S = . A type-H firm 
would then get no signaling value from offering cars to its employees. But our analysis 
continues to apply if we interpret the company car as being of superior quality (providing 
more utility than the cars owned by workers when the firms provide none). To see this, denote 
the market value and utility associated with the currently owned car and the company car by 
superscripts 0 and 1, respectively. Then the company car and the wage offered, if a company 
car is given, must satisfy 
 
10 0 () ( ) FL L L uY v u uY F v += = − + 
Provided that 
10 FF > we have 
1 0 LF L L SYYF =− +>  
and the earlier analysis applies. Alternatively, assume that L-type workers do not have cars 
but H-type workers do. Then our earlier analysis applies, with one qualification. Because in  
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that case we have  0, 0 HL SS <> , the H-type firm provides cars even in the absence of 
subsidies. 
 
3.5. Implications of the model 
The analysis shows that, given that cars signal a worker’s pay and that not all firms are 
of type H, an H-type firm favors a separating equilibrium. It prefers the highest governmental 
subsidy that induces such an equilibrium, but it benefits from any governmental subsidy that 
leads to a separating equilibrium. Lobbying efforts may then result in subsidy levels that 
induce such equilibrium. Of course, firms will lobby more when providing company cars has 
higher signaling value, and we would expect that more company cars are provided in 
situations where there are good reasons to believe that signaling is likely to work.  
First, the value of the signal may depend on the size of the firm. A small firm may 
gain little from outsiders believing it hires high-ability workers, but for a large firm the 
number of potential employees, suppliers, and customers it attracts may be substantial. 
Moreover, in large firms the cost per car provided will also be lower due to scale effects when 
leasing cars.  
Second, the value of the signal is likely to differ between countries or sectors 
depending on population mobility and the size and structure of the labor market. For example, 
signaling does not benefit a firm very much in a labor market characterized by nationwide 
recruiting and high residential mobility. In that case a person who observes that a firm hires 
high-ability workers is nevertheless unlikely to apply to a local firm. We expect more 
company cars in sectors or countries where a person seeking a job incurs high search costs, in 
labor markets with less job mobility, in countries where wages are not easily ‘observable,’ 
and in densely populated areas with more social interaction so that the signal is more widely 
observable. To the extent that the firm signals quality to attract customers we expect more 
company cars in firms that sell locally.  
Third, the model shows that a firm that provides the fringe benefit may oppose a 
government subsidizing it too heavily: a large subsidy could destroy the signaling value of the 
benefit. Fourth, the possibility of multiple equilibria suggests that a given subsidy may be 
consistent with some H-type firms offering cars while others do not.  
Lastly, as argued in the introduction, note that the model applies not just to firms but 
can, with minor modification, be re-interpreted in terms of different types of workers within a 
firm. It then predicts that not all workers within a firm will get a company car, but only those 
for whom providing a car has significant signaling value to others. For example, providing 
company cars to employees higher up in the firm’s hierarchy signals to lower staff that they 
will be rewarded well if they stay with the firm. 
The model seems consistent with the stylized facts available. Although in a given 
country the subsidy is roughly the same for all firms, not all firms provide workers with 
company cars. We see more company cars in large firms and, within firms, employees with 
higher wages (unobserved to others) are more likely to get a company car. Both issues are 
carefully documented in Guttierez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010) and Wuyts (2009)) 
for Belgium and the Netherlands. As argued above, this is consistent with the model. 
Although many other reasons for this difference may exist, differences in mobility and the 
size of the labor market may partially explain why the US does not subsidize company cars 
whereas in Europe such subsidies are widespread. As argued before, signaling makes little 
sense if firms recruit nationwide and people are willing to move long distances. 
Vandenbrande et al. (2006) document residential and labor mobility in Europe. Residential 
mobility in Europe is in general short-distance mobility: only 18% have moved outside their 
region, while the percentage for cross-border migration is especially low, at only 4%. These 
European figures can be compared with those from the US. Data collected by the US Census  
 
11
Bureau in 2000 show that almost a third of US citizens live outside the state in which they 
were born.  
We expect the provision of company cars to differ across countries depending on 
wages and car preferences, although the relation is ambiguous. Consider differences in 
average wages. If wages are low, a firm which offers a car enjoys only a small decrease in the 
wage it must pay. Conditional on car ownership, we expect more company cars in high 
income countries. But if incomes are so high that almost any person would buy a car of good 
quality, then it makes little sense to offer company cars. The role of car preferences is equally 
ambiguous.  
  To conclude this section, note that it is often argued that company cars (and some 
other fringe benefits) in Europe have been introduced on a large scale in the 1980’s partly in 
response to restrictions on wage increases, in an effort to reduce inflation and improve 
international competitiveness of European firms. Wage restrictions raise the demand for 
fringe benefits by workers; but compared to cash, an equal increase in utility for the worker is 
more costly to the firm when providing in-kind compensation compared to cash. This raises 
the demand by firms for government subsidies to fringe benefits. This is not inconsistent with 
our model. But the model offers important extra insights. It explains why company cars are 
the preferred fringe benefit to provide, it explains why not all firms offer company cars, and it 
identifies a number of relevant characteristics that determine company car provision by firms. 
Finally, as we show in the next section, it explains why firms may want to offer workers a 
choice between the fringe benefit and a cash option.   
 
 
4. Differences in preferences towards cars 
In this section, we allow workers to differ in their preferences for cars. Let some 
people value cars (v>0) and some not (v=0). Assume for simplicity that they are equally 
distributed over H-type and L-type workers. Call the fraction of workers for whom v>0 (or 
who benefit from a car) as n. As mentioned previously, a separating equilibrium can be 
sustained when the governmental subsidy is above a critical value, and a pooling equilibrium 
can be sustained when the governmental subsidy is below a critical value. These two critical 
values will differ. But for brevity, in this section we shall discuss only the first governmental 
subsidy value, a value which sustains a separating equilibrium. Nothing is gained by also 
considering the second critical value.  
 
4.1. The L-type firm when workers differ in preferences for cars 
Reconsider the behavior of the L-type firm. If the subsidy covers less than the full cost 
of the car, it never makes sense for the firm to give a car to a worker who places no value on a 
car. These workers are paid  L Y .  
It may make sense to give a car to workers with a strong preference for cars. Such 
workers have to be paid a wage 
1
FL Y that solves 
 
1 () ( ) FL L L uY v u uY += =          ( 8 )  
The firm will give a car if the governmental subsidy exceeds 
1
L S  , where  
 
11
FL L L YF S Y +− =          ( 9 )  
An L-type firm which gives cars to workers with strong car preferences can let workers sort 
themselves out by offering two contract types: a contract which pays a wage  L Y  and gives no  
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car, and a contract which pays the lower wage 
1
FL Y  but gives a car. Workers with v=0 will 
prefer the first contract; workers with v>0 will prefer the second.   
 
4.2. The H-type firm when workers differ in preferences for cars  
Employees of type H with a high preference for a car receive a company car; they 
must be paid a wage that solves: 
 
1 () ( ) FH H H uY v u uY += =          ( 1 0 )  
To sustain a separating equilibrium, the subsidy must exceed 
1
H S  , where  
 
11
FH H H F YF S Y P +− = +          ( 1 1 )  
As before,  F P is the value of the signal (the value to the firm of having outsiders believe it is of 
type H). By the same arguments as in Section 3, we have  
11
HL SS <            ( 1 2 )  
Of course, if the signaling value is high and the governmental subsidy is large, an equilibrium 
may result in which the H-type firm profits from giving cars to all workers, even to those that 
do not benefit from a car. Such workers have to be paid YH, whether they get a car or not. But 
giving them a car has implications for wages to other workers. Two possible scenarios appear. 
First, the firm can pay  H Y  to all workers (the maximum of the two wages
1 , H FH YY) to attract 
workers with either high and low preference for a car. Then a worker with a high car 
preference is better off in equilibrium than a worker who does not value a car. Second, the 
firm could pay workers of each type the wage needed to attract them, so it pays 
1 , HF H YY to the 
two groups. But then a worker with a positive value of v has an incentive to misrepresent his 
type, pretending that for him v=0. He would get a car anyway and receive the higher income. 
In both cases, therefore, the ultimate outcome is likely to be the same: the firm pays  H Y to all 
workers, which is what we assume. 
 
4.3. Equilibria when workers differ in preferences for cars  
As before, a firm’s incentive to provide a company car to a worker varies with the cost 
of the car to the firm, captured by the size of the governmental subsidy. The average ‘net’ cost 
(net means, as before, that we take account of governmental subsidies and the possible value 
of the signal when a car is given) to the H-type firm of employing a worker now depends on 
whether the firm gives (i) no cars, (ii) cars only to employees who value cars, (iii) cars to all 
employees, even those who do not value it. Moreover, the net cost also depends on whether 
the L-type firm gives a company car. If it does not, providing a car allows the H-type firm to 
signal its type. If the L-type firm provides cars to workers with v>0, then for the H-type firm 
giving a company car only to workers with v>0 has no more signaling value. However, some 
signaling value remains if the H-type firm provides a company car to all its employees: 
anyone with a company car is more likely to work for an H-type firm than for an L-type firm, 
and this difference in probability implies the signal has value to the H-type firm.  
Appendix 1 explicitly analyzes the possible equilibria. It is shown there that, 
depending on the strength of the signal and the level of the governmental subsidy, many 
different equilibria may result: several pooling equilibria (e.g., no cars are given at all, or both 
types of firms provide cars only to people with a high preference for cars) and separating 
equilibria (e.g., L-type firms give no cars and H-type firms give cars to workers for whom 
v>0, L-type firms give no cars and H-type firms give cars to all workers) are possible. It is 
shown that, if the signal is weak, the H-type firm will never give cars to all employees when 
the L-type firm gives no cars. It only does so when the L-type firm also gives cars, and the 
subsidy is very large (much larger than
1
L S ). For intermediate signal strength, the H-type firm  
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will never give cars to all employees when the L-type firm gives no cars; however, if the L-
type firm does give cars, the H-type gives cars to all. Lastly, for a very strong signal, the H-
type firm may give cars to all workers even if the L-type gives no cars; this happens even at 
relatively low subsidies.  
Table 1 summarizes the main findings derived in Appendix 1. In this table, 
2
H S  is the 
minimum governmental subsidy that sustains an equilibrium in which the H-type firm gives 
company cars to all workers (even those with low preference for having one), provided the L-
type firm does not give its employees a car. Similarly, 
2,L
H S is the minimum subsidy that makes 
giving cars to all workers profitable for the H-type firm, even if the L-type firm gives cars.  
Two major conclusions follow from the analysis. First, if the signal is sufficiently 
strong, an equilibrium may result in which the H-type firm gives a car to all workers, even 
those that do not care for having one. Second, from the perspective of the H-type firm, a 
separating equilibrium in which the L-type firm does not provide cars is always optimal. For 
low values of the signal, the H-type firm prefers a separating equilibrium in which it provides 
cars only to workers that value receiving one (v>0). High signaling values may yield a 
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Unless it can obtain unrealistically large governmental subsidies, the H-type firm 
prefers a subsidy that is just below 
1
L S , the largest value that sustains a separating equilibrium. 
Depending on the strength of the signal, the number of workers that value a car and the 
intensity of their preference for a car, the H-type firm will provide all workers or only some of 
its workers with a company car.  
Equilibria in which firms provide company cars only to workers with a strong 
preference for a car are consistent with practice by many European firms. Many firms offering 
company cars indeed provide employees with a pure cash option and allow them to self-select 
the contract type (see Watson/Wyatt (2008)). In the UK, for example, over 70% of firms 
offering company cars provide employees with a pure cash option. In Belgium and the 
Netherlands, it amounts to 25-30%. Based on our model, one expects firms not to offer a cash 
option only if the signaling value is very high and large subsidies can be obtained.    
    
5. Continuous car values 
This section briefly considers the case where the fringe benefit is continuous, say, cars 
of various qualities can be offered. To study this case, we return to the situation without 
preference differences between workers. Quality is measured by the market price of a car. We 
therefore interpret F as a continuous choice variable. Worker utility of a car that costs F is 
given by: 
() ; '0 ,"0 vF v v ><
 
We allow the government to subsidize a fraction s of the cost of the car. Initially we will 
assume that any car value is available on the car market, i.e., no restrictions will be placed on 
the car value F a firm can provide. An extension with minimum restrictions on available car 
values is briefly discussed in Appendix 2.   
  
5.1. L-type firm with continuous car values  
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Consider the option for an L-type firm of providing a company car to its workers. The 
wage an L-type firm must offer then depends on the quality of the car it provides.  Let  FL be 
the market price of the car offered by the L-type firm, and let YFL be the wage offered when 
the firm provides a car. For any given car quality, the wage the firm needs to pay will satisfy:  
()( ) ( ) FL L L L uY vF u uY += =
 
An infinite number of wage and car value combinations satisfy this expression. By the 




















∂ .  
Our assumption that the fringe benefit does not affect worker productivity implies that 
the firm determines the car value to be offered to minimize the cost of employing a worker:  
  ( ) (1 ) subject to 0
L
FL L L L F Min Y F s F F +− ≥ 
The L-type firm provides a positive value of the fringe benefit if the unconstrained optimum 
of this problem is positive. We denote the optimal car value of the unconstrained problem, 
conditional on a given subsidy s, as 
*() L Fs . The minimum governmental subsidy that induces 
the L-type firm to offer a positive value of the fringe benefit (the minimum subsidy that 
gives
*() L F s >0) is denoted  L s .   
We know that 
*() L Fs satisfies the first-order condition: 
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∂   
A larger subsidy leads to better cars. 
If the optimal value 
*() L Fs of the fringe benefit is nonzero, then it must be the case 
that: 
() ()
** () ( 1 ) () . FLL L L YF s s F s Y +− <
 
To see this, note that for F=0 the inequality above becomes an equality, and since
*() L Fs is the 
cost minimizing value of the fringe benefit, it yields lower cost than at F=0. The minimum 
subsidy that induces the firm to offer a positive fringe benefit satisfies 
  ( ) ( )
** () ( 1 ) () . FL L L L L L L YF s sF s Y +− =
       ( 1 4 )  
One easily shows that the left-hand side of this expression declines with s at a decreasing rate.  
 
5.2. H-type firm with continuous car values 
An H-type firm which provides a company car may benefit from signaling that it hires 
high-quality workers. This benefit, as before, is called  F P . If the H-type firm provides cars of 
lower or equal quality than does an L-type firm then there is no signaling value. Let us denote 
the value of the car offered by the H-type firm as  H F .Thus, if an H-type firm offers a car with 
H L FF > , its ‘net’ employment cost per worker is: 
() (1 ) . FH H F Ys F p +− −
         ( 1 5 )   
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Otherwise, this cost is 
() (1 ) . FH H Ys F +−           ( 1 6 )  
Combinations  , FHH YF must satisfy:  
 
()( ) ( ) FH H H H uY vF u uY += =
 
Let 
*() H Fs be the solution to the problem 
  () ( 1)
H
FH H H F F
Min Y F s F p +− −  
As before, higher subsidies lead to better cars. Note that the optimal value depends on the 
governmental subsidy s, but it is independent of the quality of the signal. The latter does 
affect the minimum subsidy that will induce the H-type firm to provide cars, see below.  
Assuming that cars are normal goods and given declining marginal utility of income, it 
is easy to show that:  
** () () HL Fs Fs >  
If a given subsidy leads the L-type firm to provide cars, the H-type firm will necessarily 
provide a car of higher quality to its employees. Moreover, if it provides cars, we have  
( ) ( )
** () ( 1 ) () FH H H F H YF s s F s pY +− − <  
We denote the minimum governmental subsidy that induces the H-type firm to offer a car in a 
separating equilibrium as  H s . Any value of s which induces an L-type firm to provide a car 
makes it profitable for an H-type firm to give a more expensive car. As this also holds at  L s ,  
and the cost minimizing car value increases with s, it follows that  LH s s > . 
 
5.3. Equilibrium results with continuous car values 
We illustrate the results on Figure 2. The upper panel shows the optimal values of the 
fringe benefit for L-type and H-type firms, respectively, as functions of the subsidy. The 
lower panel depicts the net labor cost per worker, again as function of the subsidy level.  
At low subsidy levels, no cars are provided. For levels  HL s ss < <  a separating 
equilibrium has the H-type firm provide cars but not the L-type firm. If, for a given 
governmental subsidy s, the L-type firm provides cars to its employees  ( L s s > ), then the H-
type firm will also provide cars, and these will be more expensive than those offered by the L-
type firm.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
With continuous values of fringe benefits the governmental subsidy which maximizes 
an H-type firm’s profit is, unlike in the fixed cost case, the largest possible subsidy. Of 
course, this follows from our assumption that the signal has full force once the quality offered 
by the H-type exceeds that of the L-type. Different assumptions (for example, making the 
strength of the signal a function of the deviation between both qualities offered) may lead to 
different conclusions.  
  In Appendix 2, we relax the assumption that all qualities are available on the market 
by imposing a minimum quality that has to be offered. As is shown there, this has no impact 




It is generally believed that firms provide some fringe benefits such as company cars 
mainly because of the favorable tax treatment of such benefits. In this paper we develop a 
simple model that may partially explain why governments allow these implicit subsidies. It is 
based on the argument that for some firms company cars can signal information about what 
compensation the firm pays or about what types of workers the firms attracts. Firms that 
benefit from outsiders believing that they pay high wages may then find it profitable to lobby 
for subsidies when it gives company cars to employees. Alternatively, firms may benefit 
when junior workers believe that senior workers are well paid and offer fringe benefits to 
senior workers as signals of high but unobservable wages. Junior workers may believe that 
they too will be rewarded for staying with that employer; the firm benefits due to higher effort 
and lower turnover costs. In both cases, subsidies for company cars may then be the result of 
government policy responding to lobbying by firms.   
The central idea of this paper is straightforward--- an employer may provide some 
fringe benefits for the purpose of signaling to outsiders what type of workers it employs. One 
contribution of the paper is to show that under plausible conditions the provision of fringe 
benefits indeed can signal the firm's type. But the analysis does more. It demonstrates the 
existence of multiple equilibria---one equilibrium has no firm providing certain fringe 
benefits, whereas another equilibrium has fringe benefits provided to signal the firm's type. 
The paper shows why a firm that provides the fringe benefit may oppose a government 
subsidizing it too heavily: a heavy subsidy could destroy the signaling value of the benefit. 
The analysis further shows that an employer may even provide a fringe benefit to employees 
who place no value on it. More generally, the model predicts that firms will want to provide 
fringe benefits that have a signaling value and, therefore, they want fringe benefits that are 
easily observable by others. Company cars fulfill this objective well. This, together with most 
households having one or at most two cars, may explain the popularity of company cars as a 
fringe benefit versus other consumer goods. Moreover, by sticking the name of the firm on the 
car (which is much more difficult for, say, jewelry or clothing), the signaling value is large.  
Similar analysis can apply to other choices made by the firm.  A firm may locate in an 
expensive, prestigious, location---a person who works in Manhattan likely lives in or near 
Manhattan, where housing is expensive, and so suggesting that he earns a high income. A 
firm which has its workers travel in business class and stay in plush hotels likely pays its 
workers well, so that they value such amenities rather than preferring more cash. 
The qualitative results are surprisingly robust. They appear when workers differ in 
their valuations of cars, when the quality of a car is variable or fixed, when a minimum 
quality of car exists and when it does not. A firm may find it profitable to signal its type by 
offering a company car both when other firms adopts the same signaling strategy, and when 
they do not but a firm may deviate from a pooling equilibrium. The model can explain what 
governmental subsidy level for fringe benefits a firm may prefer---if government is 
constrained to treat all firms the same, then some firms in the industry (perhaps even most) 
may prefer that government offer a low subsidy rather than a high one, and that preference 
holds even if firms pay none of the taxes required to finance the subsidy.  
The model seems consistent with many stylized facts. Although the subsidy is the 
same for all firms, not all firms provide workers with company cars. We see more company 
cars in large than in small firms, because the quality of the signal is likely to be better for 
larger firms. A small firm may gain little from outsiders believing it hires high-ability 
workers---the number of potential employees, suppliers, customers it attracts is in any case 
small. Within firms we expect more company cars among senior workers. Both predictions 
are confirmed in detailed empirical analyses (Guttierez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010),  
 
18
Wuyts (2009)). The model further suggests that firms that offer fringe benefits such as 
company cars may want to offer pure cash alternatives. This is again consistent with observed 
firm behavior (see Watson Wyatt (2008)). Although many other reasons for this difference 
may exist, differences in mobility and the size of the labor market may partially explain why 
the US does not subsidize company cars whereas in Europe such subsidies are widespread. As 
argued in the paper, signaling does not make much sense if firms recruit nationwide and 
people are willing to move long distances. Lastly, as a more general statement the model 
suggests that companies will provide fringe benefits that are perceived as good signals of the 
quality of workers and firms. 
Our approach does not explain all fringe benefits offered to workers; it will not apply, 
for example, to health benefits. But though we spoke of company cars as the fringe benefits 
under consideration, the approach can apply to other visible benefits, such as membership in 
golf courses, stays at expensive hotels or flights in the first-class cabin about which the 
worker can brag, meals at expensive restaurants which the worker can describe to others, or 
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Appendix 1: Equilibria when workers differ in their valuations of cars 
 
This appendix extends the basic model to consider variation in preferences for cars 
among workers. We suppose that a fraction, n, of workers place a positive value on a car 
(v>0); a fraction (1-n) gains no utility from having a car (v=0).  
The incentives for an H-type firm to provide a company car to a worker varies with the 
size of the subsidy. We consider the average ‘net’ cost (net in the sense that we take account 
of subsidies and the possible value of the signal when a car is given) to the H-type firm of 
employing a worker. This cost depends on whether the firm gives (i) no cars, (ii) cars only to 
employees who value cars; (iii) cars to all employees, even those who do not value it. 
Moreover, the net cost depends on whether the L-type firm gives a company car. If it does 
not, providing a car allows the H-type firm to signal its type. If the L-type firm provides cars 
to workers with v=0, then there is no more signaling value for the H-type firm when it gives 
cars only to workers with positive v, because to an outsider a company car then provides no 
information about the firm’s type.  
However, some signaling value remains if the H-type firm provides a company car to 
all its employees: anyone with a company car is more likely to work for an H-type firm than 
for an L-type firm, and this difference in probability implies the signal has value to the H-type 
firm. Suppose that the L-type firm provides cars to workers for whom v>0, and that the H-
type firm provides cars to all workers. To simplify the analysis, suppose that the number of 
workers at H-type firms is the same as the number of workers at L-type firms. Under these 
assumptions, it is easily shown that the probability that a worker with a company car works 
for an H-type firm is 1/(1+n).  If in the solution described an H-type firm provided no cars, 
outsiders would believe that the firm is an L-type. If the H-type firm does provide a car to all 
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In Table A1 we report the average net cost of a worker to the H-type firm depending 
on whether the L-type firm gives cars and whether the H-type firm gives a car to a fraction or 
to all its employees. Using this information we now proceed to study the different possible 





  Average net cost H-type firm, 
L-type firm gives no cars 
Average net cost H-type 
firm, L-type firm gives 
cars 
H-type firm gives 
no car 
H Y   H Y  
H-type firm gives 
car to fraction n<1 
of employees  
1 (1 ) ( ) H FH F nY nY F S p −+ + − −  
1 (1 ) ( ) HF H nY nY F S − ++ −  
H-type firm gives 
car to all employees 
H F YF S p +−−   1
1
H F YF S p
n
⎛⎞ +−− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
 
Table A1: employment costs H-type firm 
 
 
L-type firm does not provide cars 
Suppose an L-type firm provides none of its workers with a car. Then an H-type firm 
will provide a car to the fraction n workers that care for cars but not to others if this leads to 
the lowest cost. From Table 1 it follows that this implies two inequalities: 
 
1 (1 ) ( ) H FH F H nY nY F S p Y ⎡⎤ −+ + − −< ⎣⎦  
  [ ]
1 (1 ) ( ) H FH F H F n Y n Y FSp Y FSp ⎡⎤ −+ + − −< + − − ⎣⎦  
Denote the cutoff value of the subsidy that makes the first and the second inequality both 
equalities by, respectively 
12 , H H SS
 
These values are easily determined. They are given by: 
 
11
HF F H H SF p YY =− + −                        (A1.1) 
21 ()
1





−                       (A1.2)
  
 
This implies the H-type firm given the fringe benefit to part of the employees only (viz. to 
those with v>0) if the subsidy satisfies: 
  
12
HH SS S <<                           (A1.3) 
 
But of course, it may be even more profitable for the H-type firm, given that the L-
type does not give its employees a car, to provide a car to all employees, including those that 




H SS >  
 
A large subsidy and a strong signal may make it profitable to provide cars to all its 
employees, though doing so increases the cost to a firm of hiring a worker. The cutoff subsidy 
level, as expected, will be lower for a high-quality signal; it is higher if more people care 





L-type firm provides cars to workers with v>0. 
If v is sufficiently large and for a sufficiently large subsidy, then an L-type firm will 
provide cars to its workers with v>0. An H-type firm which behaved in the same way could 
then not signal that it hires H-type workers---an observer would know that a worker with a 
company car has v>0, but by assumption such a worker is equally likely to be an H-type as an 
L-type. Nevertheless, if an L-type firm finds it profitable to provide company cars to workers 
with v>0, then an H-type firm also finds it profitable to do so. This is easily shown, using 
1 () H FH YY − >
1 () LF L YY − .  
Moreover, the H-type firm will provide a car to all employees if (see Table A1): 
1 1
(1 ) ( )
1
H FH H F nY nY F S Y F S p
n
⎛⎞ −+ + − > + − − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠  





FHH F nY Y F S F S p
n
⎛⎞ −+ −> − − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
                   




H SS >  
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n




                   (A1.4) 
Obviously, this subsidy is only realistic if the signal is very strong. If the signal is weak, it 
actually exceeds the cost of the car (because
1 () H FH YY − >0). Moreover, note that direct 
comparison shows (using (A1.2) and (A1.4)): 
   
 
22 , L
HH SS >                            (A1.5)
  
The minimum subsidy that induces the H-type firm to give cars to all employees is lower 
when the L-type firm also gives cars. The reason is that the H-type firm in that case has more 
of an incentive to give cars to all workers because this provides signaling value; giving cars 
only to workers that have v>0 does not.  
 
 
Analysis of equilibria   
An H-type firm now faces two related problems. First, how does the net average cost 
of employing workers vary with the level of the subsidy? Second, given this relation, if the 
firm could set the subsidy (which would apply to both types of firms), what subsidy 
maximizes the firm’s profit? In other words, for what level of subsidy should the firm lobby?  
To study these issues, note that the subsidy at which the L-type firm gives cars is independent 
of the signal; the latter does determine the different cutoff subsidies (
122 , ,,
L
H HH SSS) for the H-



















Based on this information there are three relevant cases to be considered, depending 
on the positions of
22 , ,
L
H H SS (the critical subsidies for the H-type firm to give cars to all 
employees, conditional on whether the L-type firm gives cars or not) relative to 
1
L S  (the 
critical subsidy for the L-type firm to give cars). Note that 
2
H S is only relevant when it is 
below 
1
L S ; similarly, 
2,L
H S matters only when it exceeds 
1
L S . As we will see, each case can be 





12 , 2 L
LH H SS S <<  (relevant is only 
12 , L
LH SS < ) 
The last inequality always holds under our assumptions. Using the information given 
in Table 1, the condition 
12 , L
LH SS < can be reformulated as a condition on the strength of the 
signal; using the definitions of the two subsidy levels, we find that it is equivalent to  
  ()
21 1 (1 ) ( )
1
FL F L H F H
n
pn Y Y Y Y
n
⎡⎤ <− − + − ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
                              (A1.6) 
This case is depicted on Figure A1. The figure has the subsidy level on the horizontal axis and 
measures the net cost per worker, as defined in Table A1 above, on the vertical axis.   
 
INSERT FIGURE A1 
 
At low subsidy levels (
1
H SS < ) no cars are provided by neither of the firms. For 
subsidy levels  
11
H L SS S <<  a separating equilibrium results where the H-type firm gives cars 
to its workers with a strong preference for cars, and the L-type firm does not give cars. 
Subsidies 
12 , L
LH SS S <<  imply loss of the signaling value for the H-type firm if only cars are 
given to people for whom v>0, but given our assumptions it is still profitable to provide a car 
to the same fraction n of workers as before, because the high subsidy implies that the average 
cost of labor is less than when not giving cars.  To see this, the cost marginally above 
1
L S is 
11 (1 ) ( ) H FH L nY nY F S −+ + −  
Using (9) and substituting the result gives 
() ( )
11
HF H H F L L Yn Y Y YY ⎡⎤ +− − − ⎣⎦  
This is necessarily smaller than  H Y . So 
12 , L
LH SS S << yields a pooling equilibrium in which both 
firms give cars to people that care for getting one. Finally, 
2,L
H SS > implies the H-type firm 
benefits from giving cars to all workers, yielding an equilibrium where the L-type gives cars 
to people with v>0 and the H-type gives cars to all workers.  
What is the H-type firm’s most preferred subsidy that it realistically may be able to get 
through lobbying? It is a subsidy just below  
1
L S  ; this implies a separating equilibrium where 
the H-type firm gives a car to people caring for cars, and the L-type does not give cars. 
Although very high subsidies lead to even lower cost per employee, such subsidies are 
unrealistic as they require values close to or above the full cost of the car. In sum, the H-type 
firm benefits from any subsidy that induces a separating equilibrium, but its most preferred 
subsidy is just below 
1




2, 1 2 L
HL H SS S < <  
Again, the relevant conditions can be translated as restrictions on the value of the 
signal. Using the definitions given above (see (9), (A1.2) and (A1.4)), we easily show 
that
2, 1 2 L
H LH SS S <<is equivalent to: 
() ()
21 1 1 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )
11
L FL H FH F L FL H FH
nn
nY Y Y Y P Y Y Y Y
nn
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −− + − < < − + − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −− ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦    (A1.7) 
This situation, which reflects a stronger signal (compare (A1.7) and (A1.6)) is illustrated on 
Figure A2. Note that the position of 
1
H S relative to 
2,L
H S is irrelevant since the latter only 
matters to the extent it exceeds 
1
L S , which is not the case. 
  
INSERT FIGURE A2 
 
At low subsidies, nothing changes compared to the previous case: no firm provides 
cars when the subsidy is less than
1
H S . For subsidies 
11
HL SS S < <  we have a separating 
equilibrium where the H-type firm provides a car only to employees with a strong preference 
for cars; the L-type does not give cars. Subsidies in the range 
1
L SS >  yield an equilibrium 
where the L-type does given cars to people with a preference for having one; the H-type firm 
now finds it profitable to provide cars to all employees.   
Interestingly, for this case of intermediately strong signals small changes in subsidy 
(from just below to above 
1
L S ) may have dramatic effects on the number of cars provided. Just 
below this value only the H-type gives cars, and it does so only to part of the employees; just 
above this value, the L-type gives cars and the H-type gives cars to all employees.    
However, the most desirable subsidy the H-type firm can realistically obtain is again 
likely to be a subsidy just below  
1
L S  , generating a separating equilibrium. Providing cars to 
all might imply a lower cost per worker, but it is easily shown that this requires the subsidy to 




FLL F HH F
nn
FnY Y Y Y P
n
−+ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −− − − − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ + ⎝⎠
 
Given our assumptions the term 
11 () ( ) FL L FH H YY YY ⎡⎤ −− − ⎣⎦ <0 so that for reasonable values of n 
the required subsidy is again close to or even above the cost of the car.   
 
 Case  3: 
12 1
H HL SSS <<  (relevant is only last inequality, the first one always holds) 
Lastly, consider the situation 
21
HL SS < . This implies, using the definitions (see (9) and 




FL F L H F H
n
pY Y Y Y
n
⎡⎤ >−+ − ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦             
     (A1.8)    
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This case is illustrated on Figure A3.  
 
  INSERT FIGURE A3 
 
At low subsidies  1
H SS <  no firm provides company cars. For subsidies 
12
HH SS S <<  a 
separating equilibrium results where the H-type firm provides cars to only high preference 
people, for 
21
HL SS S <<  all H-firm employees get a car. Beyond this level the signaling value is 
partially lost, but the signal is so strong that it still pays to give all people a car, despite the L-
type also giving cars.  
Again, the H-type firm prefers subsidies just below the cutoff where the L-type firm 
also gives cars, unless the subsidy grows unrealistically large. Providing cars to all might 




FLL F HH F
nn
F nY Y Y Y P
n
−+ ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −− − − − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ + ⎝⎠
 
In sum, the H-type firm benefits from subsidies that induce a separating equilibrium. 
Especially if the signaling value of a car is strong it will be quite satisfied with lower 
subsidies, but the ‘optimal’ subsidy is likely to be one that just prevents the L-type firm from 
giving cars.  
 
The role of the strength of the signal  
Summarizing our findings of Appendix 1 is easiest when considering the role of the 
strength of the signal. The summarizing results are in Table A2.  
If the signal is weak (case 1), the H-type firm will never give cars to all employees 
when the L-type firm gives no cars. It only does so when the L-type firm gives also cars and 
the subsidy is very large (much larger than
1
L S ). If the signal is medium strong (case 2), the H-
type firm will never give cars to all employees when the L-type firm gives no cars; however, 
if the L-type firm does give cars, the H-type firm gives cars to all. Hence from a subsidy equal 
to
1
L S  it gives cars to all. Finally, for a very strong signal (case 3), the H-type firm may give 
cars to all workers even if the L-type gives no cars, hence at relatively low subsidies well 
below 
1
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Pn Y Y Y Y
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LH SS <   Separating 
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,2 1 2 L
H L H SS S < < Separating 
 






FL F L H F H
n
PY Y Y Y
n
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21
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Appendix 2: The case of continuous car quality with a lower bound on quality  
Suppose the lowest quality car available is  0 F . The analysis must then be slightly 
modified. Consider the following problem (looking at the L-type firm):  
0 ()( 1 ) . .
L
FL L L L F Min Y F s F st F F +− ≥
 
Let, as before, the solution to the unconstrained problem be given by 
*() L F s . This is rising in s. 
If 
*
0 () L F sF ≥ the firm provides a company car with value equal to 
*() L F s . Define the subsidy 
that implies 
*
0 () L F sF = as 
0
L s . Now if  
*
0 () L F sF < the firm will still provide a car of value 
0 F provided this yields a lower labor cost per worker than not providing a car. This will be the 
case if 
( ) ( ) 00 (1 ) FLL YF s F Y +− < 
If the opposite holds providing no car is better than providing the lowest value car available 
on the market and no cars are provided at all. Let the solution to   
  ( ) ( ) 00 (1 ) FL L YF s F Y +− = 
be denoted 
0
L s .  
We then have the following. For 
0
L s s < the firm gives no company cars. For 
00
LL s ss <<  the firm provides cars of the minimum value  0 F available on the market. For 
0
L s s >  it provides cars of better than minimal value 
*() L F s . See Figure A4 for illustration. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE A4 
 
For the H-type firm a similar story holds. The argument used in the main body of the 
paper holds here as well: an H-type firm provides a better car than does an L-type firm. And 
using the same argument as before, it still holds that 
00
L H s s > .  
All qualitative results remain unchanged with one minor qualification. Since for the 
range where both H- and L-types would provide the minimum quality of cars (both 
constraints binding), the signaling value would be lost for the H-type firm. It will be optimal 




























































































































YFH cash wage paid by H-type firm when it offers a car at cost F 
 
YFL cash wage paid by L-type firm when it offers a car at cost F 
PF Benefit to H-type firm of belief by outsiders that it hires H-type workers. 
n fraction of workers for whom v>0. 
sL Critical value of subsidy which induces an L-type firm to offer a company car 
sH Critical value of subsidy which induces an L-type firm to offer a company car 
v Utility of a worker from a car 
 